Upcoming meetings
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DATE
April 24, 11:30-12:30 PZ048 March 27, 11:30-12:30 PZ048 Feb 20, 11:30-12:30 PZ004 Feb 6, 11:30-12:30 PZ004 Jan 23, 11:30-12:30 PZ004 Nov 28, 11:30-12:30 PZ003 Nov 14, 11:30-12:30 PZ003 Sep 27, 1445-1630 PZ50 |
PAPER
Dana, J.D. and Spier, K.E (2018). Bundling and Quality Assurance. Rand Journal of Economics, 49(1), 128-154. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1756-2171.12222/full Rahman, D. (2012). But who will monitor the monitor? American Economic Review, 102(6), 2767-97. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.102.6.2767 Krähmer, D. and Strausz, R. (2015). Dynamic Mechanism Design, Chapter 11 in: Tilman Börgers: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press. Armstrong, M. (2017). Ordered consumer search. Journal of the European Economic Association, 15(5), 989-1024. doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvx017 Cancelled Fleckinger, Pierre, Matthieu Glachant, and Gabrielle Moineville. 2017. "Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9(1): 242-74: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20150119 Baranov, Oleg, Christina Aperjis, Lawrence M. Ausubel, and Thayer Morrill. 2017. "Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9(3): 1-27: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20160087 Bedre-Defolie & Biglaiser (2017). "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry in Markets with Nonpivotal Buyers" AER, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20151710 |
Past Meetings
- Feb 21, 2017: Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011). "Bayesian Persuasion." American Economic Review",101(6), 2590–2615. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
- Jan 24, 2017: Martimort, David, and Wilfried Sand‐Zantman. "A Mechanism Design Approach To Climate‐Change Agreements." Journal of the European Economic Association,14(3), 669-718 (2015).
- Nov 29, 2016: Allan Collard-Wexler, Gautam Gowrisankaran and Robin S. Lee, “Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~robinlee/papers/BargainingInBilateralOligopoly.pdf
- Nov 15, 2016: Tirole, Jean (2015). “Cognition-intensive contracting”, mimeo. Available at: http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/by/tirole/cognition_intensive_contracting_220715.pdf
- Nov 1, 2016: Leshem, S. (2010). The benefits of a right to silence for the innocent. Rand Journal of Economics, 41, 398-416.
- http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00105.x/abstract
- Oct 11, 2016: Piccolo, S., Tedeshi, P. & Ursino, G. (2015). How limiting deceptive practices harms consumers. Rand Journal of Economics, 46, 611-624.
- http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/1756-2171.12099/abstract
- Sept 27, 2016: Baker, S. & Mezzetti, C. (2012). A theory of rational jurisprudence. Journal of Political Economy, 120(3), 513-551.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/666655 - Apr 5, 2016: Murooka, T. (2015, January 11). Deception under Competitive Intermediation. PDF
- Mar 22, 2016: Bergemann, D., Brooks, B., & Morris, S. (2015). The Limits of Price Discrimination. American Economic Review, 105(3), 921–957. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.20121640
- Mar 15, 2016: Bergemann, D., Brooks, B., & Morris, S. (2015). The Limits of Price Discrimination. American Economic Review, 105(3), 921–957.http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130848 921
- Nov 24, 2015: Choi, J.P. & Gerlach, H. (2015). “Patent pools, litigation, and innovation.” Rand Journal of Economics, 46(3), 499-523.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1756-2171.12095/epdf - Nov 10, 2015: Acemoglu, D., & Jackson, M. O. (2014). “Social norms and the enforcement of laws.” (No. w20369). National Bureau of Economic Research.
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20369 - Oct 13, 2015: Chen, D. (2015). “Can markets stimulate rights? On the alienability of legal claims.” Rand Journal of Economics, 46(1), 23-65.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1756-2171.12076/pdf - Mar 24, 2015: Levin, J. (2003). Relational Incentive Contracts. The American Economic Review, 93(3), 835–857.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3132119 - Mar 17, 2015: Tirole, J. (2009). Cognition and Incomplete Contracts. The American Economic Review, 99(1), 265–294.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/29730184 - Mar 10, 2015: Kaya, A., & Vereshchagina, G. (2014). Partnerships versus Corporations: Moral Hazard, Sorting, and Ownership Structure. The American Economic Review, 104(1), 291–307.
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.104.1.2914.1.291 - Mar 3, 2015: Hiriart, Y., & Martimort, D. (2012). How much discretion for risk regulators? The RAND Journal of Economics, 43(2)
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00166.x/abstract - Feb 24, 2015: Armstrong, M. (2014, July). Search and Ripoff Externalities
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57958/ - Dec 16, 2014: Lerner, Josh, and Jean Tirole. Standard-essential patents. No. w19664. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013, forthcoming in the Journal of Political Economy.
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19664 - Dec 2, 2014: Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. Laws and norms. No. w17579. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011.
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17579 - Nov 25, 2014: Farrell, Joseph and Carl Shapiro (2008). How strong are weak patents? American Economic Review, 98(4), 1347-1369.
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.4.1347&fnd=s
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